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NAME	Júlia Alves Ferreira Pio Martins
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"A critical analyses over the peace agreements signed by the UN regarding the aspect of participation on the UNSCR 1325/2000"

by

# JÚLIA PIO

A dissertation presented to the

# FACULTY OF LAW INDEPENDENT COLLEGE DUBLIN

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#### **ABBREVIATIONS**

ARCSS - Agreement to Settle the Conflict in South Sudan

BRA - Revolutionary Army of Bougainville

CEDAW - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CSO - Civil society organization

CSW - Commission on the Status of Women

FMLN - Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front

LURD - Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MHS - Mutually Hurting Stalemate

MODEL - Armed Movement for Democracy in Liberia

NGO - Non-Governmental Organization

NPFL - National Patriotic Front of Liberia

PNG - Papua New Guinea

**UN - United Nations** 

UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution

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#### **ABSTRACT**

Is the aspect of participation from the UNSCR 1325 reaching the UN peace agreements in the same way as they are having provisions on gender aspect? Looking forward to answering this question, this dissertation used mixed methods to analyze it. Supported by theories of conflict, conflict escalation, conflict de-escalation and mediation process, along as the quantitative analyses of UN peace agreements before and after the UNSCR 1325/2000 was possible to verify that the UN is having better achievements over women's provisions in peace agreements rather than being able to insert women in them. Who are keen to locate an adequate moment, to obtain the best outcome.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

The resolution 1325 from the UN Security Council was the first of some vitally important gender equality resolutions. It was the pioneer that had the significant meaning of being more global about gender issues. Notably, it has four basic pillars. The pillars are: participation, protection, prevention, and recovery and relief (USIP, no date).

The participation pillar touches the need for an increase of women's participation at all levels of decision making, regional, national, or international. All the aspects when it comes to decision making of conflicts (prevention, management and resolution).

Protection calls specifically for the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender based violence, in addition to in emergency and humanitarian situations (such as refugee camps).

The prevention pillar addresses the necessity of intervention strategies in the prevention of violence against women. It includes the prosecution of those who commit these crimes according to international laws, enhancing women's rights under national law, along with the support of women's peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes.refugee camps, and considering the needs of women and girls when designing the refugee camps and settlements.

Relief and recovery pillar claim for its advancement measures to address international crises through a gendered lens, including respecting the civilian and humanitarian nature of

In all pillars mentioned above security was an issue discussed directly, according to "International Relations: The Key Concepts" of security is defined by "be safe from harm", understanding, for now, that accidents may happen and it is normal. In a global aspect, realists take security as a primary concern, also a non abundant source, and from the states' perspective, anarchy means that states can not rely on other states to protect them, being able to protect themselves is a security priority. Absolutely, alliances, treaties, and cooperative ventures might happen during tireless research from the states trying to guarantee their security and also aiming for a better power balance. (Griffiths M., O'Callaghan T., Roach S., 2008, pp.1-348)

Attacks can be motivated by diverse reasons, a state could seek for a better power position, improve the access of a resource, or a state could misperceive another state's actions. Regardless of the motivation, realists take as a primary that insecurity is abundant, and to avoid it is mainstream that the state has wealth, geopolitical advantage, and the most significant: the more the state has the military power, the increased likelihood it is to be secure. (Griffiths M., O'Callaghan T., Roach S., 2008, pp.1-348).

A more radical perspective suggests that security should be conceived to embrace all humanity, and not only the states, should focus on sources of harm other than only military threats to states. The arguments for this perspective are due to two reasons. Firstly, the interstate war is still possible and the most violent conflicts are within the states. Secondly, the capacity of the state to provide security for its citizens has been destroyed by other non-military threats such as environmental problems, population growth, disease, refugees, and resource scarcity. (Griffiths M., O'Callaghan T., Roach S., 2008, pp.1-348)

A gender perspective over a conflict is more than understanding how many parts are involved in a conflict, but also how differently they touch distinct genders. The existence of the gender security gap in the conflict area where the UN's peacekeeping operations had occurred. Women have different necessities from men, especially in conflict areas. In 2005, women homicide in Bielorussia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine respectively 34,6%, 21,6%, and 27,2% of the total number of homicides. The crimes against women are generally taken as crimes of passion, the law is discriminatory where there is a lack of punishment, also the criminals sometimes count on some inadequacy of accountability and impunity for violent crimes (UNHCR, 2020).

Gender-based violence is an act committed against a person based on gender norms and unequal power relationships. It can materialize as threats of violence and coercion, by physical, emotional, psychological, or sexual nature. Also, it can be harmful to any kind of person at any age (UNHCR, 2020).

The World Health Organization says that 38% of the murders of women are committed by a male intimate partner. Consequently it is not only a security issue but also a humanitarian matter (WHO, Fact sheets, 2017).

What is required to understand is the scenario where a peace operation comes in. Commonly, the population is threatened in diverse forms; for example it could result from food distribution or production, thus they are in a starvation situation. There is possibly a civil conflict where the armed gangs are attempting to remove the government from power or threaten the population in a non-safe space. All these events lead to a stressful environment that tends to keep the situation tense and conflicts end up increasing.

Historically, women have been differentiated by their gender as individuals who possess no capacity for the same outcome as men in many aspects and types of work. Women have been fighting to guarantee the same rights as men for generations. These battles vary according to the country, its politics, and the economy. When women won the right to vote, only propertied women could participate in the privilege in the average country. The first country to grant universal suffrage was New Zealand in 1893, together with Cook Island and Colorado (US) (Staton et al, 1922).

The UN has a 2030 development goal for gender equality (see appendix 1) it means that the UN is fighting and empowering some additional international actors to do the same. The European Gender Equality institute qualifies gender equality as equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities to women and men. It does not mean that both genders are the same. However the responsibilities will not be distinct due to gender. Gender equality implies that interests, needs, and priorities of both genders are taken into consideration, and recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. It is a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and indicator of, sustainable people-centered development (EIGE, no date).

The representativeness principle is simple. An institution is representative when it is a condensed picture of what its society represents. It must be aware of the representativeness necessity due to the

credibility of what it brings along. Janowitz and Moskos (1974, pp. 109-123) created this argument based on an American picture and its army. The representativeness that they were contemplating was the racial one, not particularly the gender, but it can be used in this dissertation without any prejudice.

Even though the UN could already see the demand for gender representativeness on the UNSCR 1325/2000 of the Security Council specifically for the peacekeeping operation and their military needs, the UN Women was created only in 2010. The UN Women has the purpose of intensifying the evolution with specific priorities such as: women lead, participate in and benefit equally from governance systems; women have income security, decent work, and economic autonomy; all women and girls live a life free from all forms of violence; women and girls contribute to and have greater influence in building sustainable peace and resilience, and benefit equally from the prevention of natural disasters and conflicts and humanitarian action.

This dissertation will be focused on the first pillar of the UNSCRS 1325, the participation. On participation I will demonstrate the inclusion of women's participation in mediation processes of peace agreements along with the gender needs inclusion. To answer the question "Is the aspect of participation from the UNSCR 1325 reaching the UN peace agreements in the same way as they are having gender provisions?" I will follow a logical path for an explanation.

First, the historical background of the UNSCR 1325 will support the understanding of the motivation and the incentives of its creation. Second, what is a conflict, how it works and escalation of it. Third, the mediation process advised by the UN and used as a guide on peace agreements that supplant this methodology of conflict resolution. Fourth, data will be provided to uphold women's participation on peace agreement and peace duration. Fifth, data will be provided and analysed for gendered and civil society provisions, and women participation on peace agreement. Sixth, the analyses of data supported by conceptual conflict aspects.

Aforementioned steps will attain the verification of the two hypotheses: UN should have different entry points to include women in mediation of peace agreements, and the resolution UNSCR 1325/2000 has a bigger impact on gendered perspectives provisions rather than including women on mediation tables.

#### 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This dissertation will utilize as a literature review the authors Kriesberg and Dayton (2012, pp.1-276). These authors adhere to the basic understanding of social conflicts. In their book they highlight the five core ideas of social conflicts, that are universal and can be beneficial. (1), are waged with varying destructiveness (2), entail contested social destructions (3), all social conflicts can be transformed (4), they are dynamic and tend to move through stages (5). The comprehensive entire picture of the conflict is better shown and from that they demonstrate how a conflict escalates. Subsequently, the de-escalation process should commence and actions to solve it might be viewed. They develop their argument further in the last chapters. The escalation of a conflict is determinant, in armed conflict it might have consequences directly on the population. Furthermore, the diversity of this population is important, the escalation of the conflict tends to touch diversities on a contrasting scale. Diverse needs, demands distinct solutions.

Zartman (2001) clarifies in his article the complexity of ripeness in conflicts and stalemates. The author discusses how crucial the moment is when outside actors could move into the scene to access the conflict and gesture the pieces involved into an agreement. The author debate in another work<sup>1</sup> about the structure of a conflict, how the power is distributed and how it might affect the conflict parties. Multilateral bargaining is an important topic to be explored in this dissertation, it will be better discussed in the conflict chapter<sup>2</sup>. A general criticism among the subject of women in peace negotiations is the period of time when they enter the field. Being aware that conflicts are not linear events, characterizing and understanding the ripeness of them might be extremely hard in practice.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman, 2009)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> page 18 of this dissertation

'Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and Durability of Peace' (2018) uses mixed methods to understand a consensus of women's participation in peace negotiations contributes to equality and durability of peace after civil war. They used statistical analyses to demonstrate the correlation between peace agreements signed by female delegates and durable peace. This article will help to develop the dissertation on the matter if the women's presence are relevant, and how they affect the durability of peace after an agreement. Even though the article concludes that women's presence has a positive impact on peace agreement it has a lack of information about the influence of them on it. Also, it does not explain much about their negotiation's capabilities. Those are critics that are important to be addressed once it can change a negotiation result.

The article 'Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace' (2012) where Desirée Nilson provides statistical analyses that civil societies included on peace settlements increase the durability of peace, also a particularly profound effect on overall peace in nondemocratic societies. The studies that I have made called my attention to an important factor, the organization of those people in conflict. Because of that, the theory of organized minority (Finer's, Paretto, 1966) showed me the importance of the civil society actors and their influence. This article shows that their influence is considerable and it develops a bridge from society's requirements to the negotiation table. The authors use as a base different kinds of civil society, and not exclusively women's. Therefore, upon the conclusion, it highlights the influence that women can have through these organizations.

Weiss and Daws (2009) argue in their book a superior overview of how the conflict situations are dealt with by the UN in the international environment. Schroeder and Wapner (2018) approach the non-governmental institutions and their relation with the UN. Bunch (2018) alongside, opens her chapter discussing the principle of women's equality and nondiscrimination on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) on the basis of sex. In addition, her debate about gender

security arose the resolutions directed to gender equality and security as UNSCR 1325, 1888 and 2122.

A logical line was traced for this dissertation. The organization of the literature reflects how the dilemma's are going to be exposed. A conflict understanding is determinant for a comprehension of how it escalates, and then how each actor can influence the process to a peace agreement. Specifically, I am going to highlight women's participation, and how they are important to the peace agreement process, the influence that they have as civil societies, and how those societies are used as a link from the community to the mediation table, exposing their needs. After that, I will criticize the appropriate timing for an introduction of women in the process, once they have been on a ceasefire agreement only once (Bell et al, 2020a, 2020b), even though some gender perspective aspects were approached.

#### 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

Mixed methods will be used on this dissertation. An exploratory sequential design will be adopted (V. Creswell, Plano Clark, 2011), where the qualitative research will explain the dynamics of a conflict and how it escalates and the mediation process over the UN perspective. Furthermore, analyses over the papers published by Jana Krause, Werner Krause & Piia Bränfors (2018) and Desirée Nilsson (2012), that will lead to an interpretation (or more) of the reality of the process of integrating women in peace processes. Followed by quantitative analyses over PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset, and PA-X Gender (Bel et al. 2020), to verify over the agreements with UN signatories the civil societies participation, women's provision and women participation.

The methodology will guide the path to the main question of this dissertation "Is the aspect of participation from the UNSCR 1325 reaching the UN peace agreements in the same way as they have gender provisions?" and the verification of the hypotheses of it. The hypotheses are: UN does not have a gender guidelines on mediation of peace agreements, and the resolution UNSCR 1325

has a bigger impact on mentioning gendered perspectives provisions rather than putting women on mediation tables.

The two papers mentioned in the first paragraph of this section use statistical data to verify the influence of women and civil societies on peace processes. Along with the data of peace agreement collected on PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset, and PA-X Gender (Bel et al. 2020) it will be possible to verify the two hypotheses and answer the question of the dissertation.

#### 4. PRESENTATION OF THE DATA

This chapter will be presenting the theoretical support of what is the UNSCR 1325/2000, what is a conflict, how a conflict escalates, how it de-escalate, how a mediation process works, how civil societies might influence on a mediation process and how women might influence on mediation process through civil societies. In the next chapter the data analyses will be presented of the scenario before and after the UN resolution 1325/2000 of the agreements with some provisions of women and civil societies, and the women's participation.

Women's provision (GeWom) on peace agreements had increased since the UNSCR 1325/2000 31,65%, however the increase of women's participation (GePar) was 16,72%. It has been noticed that a correlation with agreements that had some provision over civil societies (CivSo). Over this perspective the increase of GeWom was 24,30% and of GePar was 16,62%, when without any provision of civil societies GeWom had increased 7,35% and GePar had increased 0,10%. The correlation is a subject for the next research and will not be demonstrated in this dissertation.

#### 4.1 UNSCR 1325/2000

Women's role in peace maker processes was headed by Eleanor Roosevelt, in 1946 as the first Chair of the Commision of Human rights, at the momentous of the United Nations General Assembly on the inaugural meeting she read an open letter addressing 'women of the world':

To this end: we call on the governments of the world to encourage women everywhere to take a more active part in international affairs and women who are conscious of their opportunities to come

forward and to share in the work of peace and reconstruction as they did in war and resistance. (UN, no date a)

In 1975, two important events occurred regarding the inclusion of women in peace. The first is the conference which took place in Mexico City, and culminated in an affirmation of women's roles in peacemaking in the Declaration of Mexico. The second was the Resolution 3519, passed by the General Assembly, calling for women to participate in strengthening international peace and security (UN, 1945). Even though the resolutions passed by the General Assembly are non-binding, those passed by the Security council are, under Article 25 of the statute of UN.

The Commission of the Status of Women advocated for the full involvement of women in political processes in the CEDAW Conference in 1979.

It is common to observe in the literature on this field that the resolution 1325 is seen as the crown of the fourth World Conference on Women, helded in Beijing in 1995. It raised significant global awareness on the condition of women in conflict and also seemed to promise more action, unanimously adopted by 189 countries. (Cordedda, 2010)

These two documents were an apex of the work done by female activists and NGOs in the previous 50 years. (Cordedda, 2010)

The UN Security Council adopted the 1325 resolution in October 2000. With four pillars the resolution faces different challenges and evolution of the peace, justice, and security concepts evolving. The pillars are prevention, participation, protection, and peacebuilding and recovery (UN Women, 2015).

The nature of conflict has changed. Since World War II the conflict number has drastically reduced even though the public perception is exactly the opposite. With the assistance of communication technology they currently possess an acknowledgment that conflict happens everywhere, including within the home environment (UN Women, 2015)<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Chapter 1

living an economy unregulated. Criminal action in these areas is traditionally marked by crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, and corruption. Paramilitaries and other shadowy armed groups began to appear often splintering from main rebel formations. Furthermore, the conflicts in the 1990s were caused by fragile states and powerful warlords. Nowadays the the chief anxiety corresponds with violent extremism and counter-terrorism (UN Women, 2015)<sup>4</sup>. Those types of conflict involve, more frequently, the population as the scale of destruction is on an unprecedented degree. Asymmetrical warfare is the daily-basis in these areas; it means that the conflict can be multipolar and with actors who have a different type of armed power and strategy. The historical picture of UNSCR 1325 relates to the world coming from a series of conflicts based on women, peace, and security issues as well as children and armed conflict. For example, Bosnia with approximately 100,000 and Rwanda with approximately 800,000 lives lost, in the early 1990s. In both conflicts, there was a lot of violence against women including rape, and forced pregnancies. Mass rapes were the reality in both conflicts, even though in different conditions and propositions.

Conflicts have been more protracted, in these areas. Civilians have been normalized violence and

month to guarantee an abortion did not occur. The Rwanda genocide had their rapes focus on Tutsi women who were seen as superior and by the Hutu's men They were mutilated, raped, and sometimes killed. The Hutu rapes' intentions were to destroy fiscally and emotionally the Tutsi women (Weitsman, 2008).

The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) had particularly supported the women's

movements through the decades, and the UNSCR 1325 is referred to as the crown of the fourth

World Conference on Women, held in Beijing 1995 (Cordedda, 2010).

The Bosnian rapes were targeting women for the sole purpose of inpregnation by the Serbians

looking to perpetuate their genes on that community. Those women were confined to rape camps

until they became pregnant and usually forcefully remained there for at least the eighth or ninth

<sup>4</sup> Chapter 1

In 1995, the general secretary from the UN officially announced the necessity of gender parity in the UN in general. After that, honest actions were requested by the populations and the international community. This announcement was the incentive that the community were requesting to construct additional pressure over the decision makers (UN Woman, 2015)<sup>5</sup>.

According to Appendix 2, there is a significant difference between female presence as the professional's levels increase. In different papers, the organization structure was questioned whether it was gender favoritism or just less qualified for women. This matter will not be discussed in this dissertation.

It is important to address that the UN secretariat has a larger gender disparity especially on D-2 level, which has regressed from 2006 to 2016. It demonstrates that the goal of gender parity, of 50%, in the organization will not be achieved by 2030 (UN Women, 2017). Increasingly, it shows that the UNSCR 1325 (in the paragraphs above) is failing on effectiveness specifically on this professional level.

- 2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;
- 3. Urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster; (UNSCR 1325, 2000)

From those aspects mentioned in the articles, this dissertation will consider the inclusion of women on mediation of peace agreements.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Chapter 11

#### **5.2 CONFLICT**

The conflict analysis is around the large scale conflicts and mostly international conflicts. From that they are understood as: class-based revolutions, civil rights struggles, community dispute about garbage disposal, border wars, communal confrontations, and labor-management struggles. They arose when two or more parties manifest the belief that they are incompatible objectives (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp.1-48).

A crisis for Jacoby (2008) is triggered by a combination of four aspects of interactions experienced by the parties or their allies: verbal acts, economic sanctions, political measures and military coercion. These aspects arise as threats, withholding aid, covert support of sedition, border clashes, assassinations and so on.

The authors develop five core ideas about social conflict which help to understand the whole picture of it. The first idea is that social conflicts are universal and can be beneficial. The authors understand social conflicts as natural, social, inevitable and essential aspects of social life which aim to alert individuals, organizations and communities about tensions that exist to some degree in every social relationship. They provide the pathway through the challenge and the oppressive status quo that they are now a desired social change. From this perspective social conflicts are beneficial because it moves the parties involved within from an undesired reality to a different one. It improves the relationship between erstwhile opponents. Otherwise the hierarchies would remain unchanged, organizations stagnant, and problems confronting nations could not be comprehensively considered, debated and solved (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp.1-48).

The second idea is that social conflicts are waged with varying destructiveness. Parties on social conflicts often face choices about how destructive their actions will be. Constructive forms of social conflict management would preserve relationships, maximize mutually satisfactory outcomes, and minimize reliance on violence. Examples could be political objectives through social movements and entering the political arena, providing cooperation or withdrawing support, or applying

economic pressure on the other party. Destructive formS of fighting would be when both parties understand that the conflict is in zero-sum terms<sup>6</sup>, dehumanize opponents to mobilize supporters, and rely largely on the use of extreme violence to achieve their ends (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp.1-48).

The third idea is that social conflicts entail contested social constructions. The parties of the conflict tend to have different views of what they are fighting about, in a way of trying to justify their goals and means of struggles. Stakeholders in social conflicts often start their struggle with contrasting incompatible models, metaphors, and understandings about the issue in contention. Each party tries to make its views of the conflict the predominant over the eyes of the opponent, external observers and potential allies. Moral concerns are what make conflict analysts and the parties try to understand each other or not, simplistic analyses might be harmful and mislead. For long term effectiveness, parties and analysts should avoid self-indulgent perceptiveness and seek for an understanding of how the parallel party sees the conflict (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp.1-48).

Fourth, all social conflicts can be transformed. By that the authors mean that always someone, somewhere, might possess the ability to do something to transform the conflict in a positive direction. Also, social movements, groups of interests and unofficial actors can advance peace initiatives in cases where there is a lack of leverage, credibility or will. In addition, conflicts can be transformed by new policies and laws, and other moments. It may need assistance from intermediaries to convene meetings, to transmit information, or to guarantee the adherence to agreements that are made (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp.1-48).

Fifth, Social conflicts are dynamic and tend to move through stages. Conflicts are never static, fluid and move through stages as the parties adopt new strategies, perspectives, achieve some objectives or fail to achieve others, or the composition of the groups or the environment that they are in change. Conflicts emerge, escalate, de-escalate and settle (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp.1-48).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The term zero-sum derives from game theory and from this perspective the parties understand that there is only one winner. And implies that the other part loses.

#### 4.2.1 CONFLICT ESCALATION

Understanding those five aspects as principles of conflict, the escalation is also a matter to discuss. Kriesberg and Dayton (2012, pp. 143-176) argue that conflicts escalate in two dimensions: the intensity of coercive and noncoercive inducements used to wage conflict, and how broad the impact of the conflict can be. Usually coercion is indicated by increases in direct violence, commonly the number of deaths, non violent coercion would be any disengagement of cooperation or economic sanctions. Mitchell (1981, p. 127) identifies on international conflict some examples of conflict behaviour like delay aid deliveries is viewed as a form of reducing benefits to adversaries, stopping aid, trade and diplomacy as a conclusion of interaction with the adversary, confiscating local assets as a process of imposing costs on the adversary, deploying armed forces as intensifying cost imposition, reduce conflict intensity as reduccion of cost imposition, armistice as an end of cost imposition, resume diplomacy, aid and trade as a starting point of benefit-conferring action, and increase trade and aid to new levels as a manner to intensify benefit-conferring action.

The escalation of a conflict can be studied through an internal perspective and between the relation of the adversaries. The internal perspective includes social psychological processes as the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) supporting the idea that individuals look for consistency between what they do and what they should do. As a result, they look for justification of what they have done in the last action. It leads to the understanding that actions that are more harmful or helpful are valid when the cause becomes more valued (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176). A decision making process escalates the commitment of individuals in future action in order to justify prior investments (Brockner, Rubin, 1985, p.5). It means that the entity who is in direct conflict tends to put more effort on future actions sustained and supported by the effort of the previous one. For example the escalation of commitment during the Vietnam War by Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon on its administration and George W. Bush in Iraq (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

Urgency is another contributor of conflict escalation. The feeling of being threatened gives the urgency of response, the "groupthink" shall appear under these circumstances, which means that the decision makers might take actions, sometimes already taken and without positive results, resulting in repeated actions. It occurs due to the urgency feeling that makes the decision makers fuse around one course of action without considering others feelings (Janis, 1972). The report of the 9/11<sup>7</sup> commission pointed to a groupthink with and among intelligence agencies and policy makers. It made them lose important clues, due to resistance to views and information that was adverse to the preformed understanding present in the group (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

Feelings are also important. They promote struggles that can protract and destroy. Fear, anxiety, and anger frequently arise when individuals feel attacked and this feeling has a tendency of being expressed through harm to the presumed attacker. Shame and humiliation, and the desire of revenge is the fuel of many struggles. This may be culturally conducted through institutions like wars, blood feuds, and duels, turning the process of decision making into a challenge (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

The calculation of gains and loses is always pushing the parties to take an action. The Prisoner's dilemma theory, shows the importance of the conflict escalation by rationality. In a hypothetical story of this game two men have been arrested on suspicion of committing a serious crime. Even though they are guilty there is no evidence for the conviction of both, but sufficient evidence to release one. They have the following possibilities: If both confess, both will be convicted of a serious offence, but their sentence will be reduced slightly for their cooperation. If one confesses and incriminates his accomplice, he gets off without punishment and his confederate gets the maximum sentence. If both do not say anything, they can only be convicted of a minimum sentence. The payoffs of actual conflicts are not simple as this dilemma, neither stable or known from the parties. In conflicts the parties usually face zero sum situations where it is inevitable the win-lose

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> A terrorist attack that happened on eleventh of september of 2001 by Al-Qaeda against the United States had two aircraft hijacked and crushed on two towers of the World Trade Center.

scenario and they must fight for a positive perspective for themselves. In a mixed motive game, cooperation is the key to guarantee the best scenario for both parties. Self interest would only lead to a negative situation (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

Organizational development may appear during conflicts, especially time consuming conflicts. Kriesberg and Dayton (2012, pp. 143-176) highlight three interrelated developments that tend to escalate the struggle destructively.

Leadership identification with external conflict (1), the leaders are the representative of their people and for them assume any mistake might cause huge discomfort and the price is high, suggesting weakness or submission to the enemy failing policies on external conflicts seems easier than on internal affairs, once the constituents have less probability of forming an independent opinion (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

The mobilization of the parties (2); entities that initiated the conflict tend to be less aggressive on the methods rather than the late entrees. Once they are less constrained by previous compromises with opponents, late entrees are willing to take higher risks with severe behaviour in order to solve it at once (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

The commitment to the goal (3); this aspect can bolster reliance on constructive and destructive strategies. it is likely to occur during the early stages of conflict when the other side did not experience punishment. A group's conviction of victory is likely to grow at this stage and mobilize the forces swelling feelings that can escalate and form mass mobilizations (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

Related to organizational developments, Jacoby (2008, pp. 144-159) comes with a different argument supported by East and Herman (1974) where the age of the states involved in the conflict matters considerably. Recently decolonized countries may respond differently from the nations which were decolonized first, experienced imperial withdrawal and gained independence which result in contrasting outcomes. Levy (1988) highlights the influence which recent constitutional

changes, coups, popular revolutions, and territorial secessions. Once those experiences impact the character of the administration, leads to an effect on the political elite's response to a crisis, suggesting why the duration of the regime weighs on crisis escalation.

The escalation of conflict under the perspective of the relations between adversaries are three fundamental ones: The logic of contentious interaction, when a moderated action is responded to brutally or even overreacted to. Consequently, it can be the spark of an extraordinary escalation if the underlying conditions are already heated and organizational linkages have been formed. Extreme coercive acts can be perceived as brutish and subhuman, which leads the corresponding party to act on the same level or even more brutally (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

The expansion of issues; a conflict may occur due to one issue, but additionals and more general ones might arise after the struggle begins. Practical issues such as a land division might become more complex when this land has also emotional or symbolic value. The polarization of relations, once the conflict is happening the parties tend to decry each other under a moral perspective. Where they are moral and the opponent is not, this perspective tends to create and increase the distance between the parties. What used to be avoided by international institutions when they are in conflict, might experience a withdrawal from the joint membership (Skjelsbaek, Singer, 1971).

Along with the logic of contentious interaction explained in the previous paragraph, Jacoby (2008, pp. 144-159) clarifies that conflict escalation as a dependency of the type of threat posed, how much the level of damage the oponente experiences and the level of its response (Sample, 2000), Bearing in mind that the power distribution within the international system affect how the response strategy will be developed (Baldwin, 1979).

Conflict escalation does not develop due to one aspect, the strategy of the parties has a major effect and it is characterized by a sequence of actions. The parties considered the impact on itself (1), seeing that how much onerous it can be, less sustainable it is, how gratifying the conflict is for those involved, and furthermore, if the situation of being in a conflict is structured enough to develop

careers around it that seems attractive to people. The impact on the adversary (2), when a party takes violent strategies it is intending to provoke the adversary in order to escalate the conflict, and when it happens win some support from allies that happened to be offended also by the response of the provocative action. The effects on other parties (3), the third parties are important when comes to support and influence, in a international perspective the barbarity generally must reach a high level and persistency of destruction before any official intervention (Thakur, 2006; Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 143-176).

Related to other parties being present in the conflict, those seeking to defuse the tensions and crisis shall engage in preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping or peace-building (Sanderson, 2002). The entrance of other states or multilateral organizations, when intervene one or more protagonists may lead the decision makers to a decrease of tensions or a more protracted dispute depending on the international power balance (Jacoby, 2008, pp. 144-159). Any changes in the international system and considered a long term thread, the decision makers tend to respond by increasing their military power through alliances or military build up (Vazquez, 1987, p.117). Such alliances have a trade-off involving loss of autonomy, capacity to take decisions independently and ability to respond to perceived threats (Jacoby, 2008, pp. 144-159).

#### 4.2.2 CONFLICT DE-ESCALATION

Although the content of the proposals for a solution is seen in most studies on peaceful settlement of conflicts as the key to effective conflict resolution, an increasing focus of attention shows that a second and equally important key lies in the timing of resolution efforts (Zartman, 2000). When options, normally unilateral means of achieving a suitable outcome are blocked and the parties believe that they are in an unpleasant and costly predicament, the parties settle their dispute only when they are willing to do so. They latch on to ideas at the ripe moment that have usually been in the air for a long time and that only now become appealing (Zartman, 2001).

The conflict de-escalation are procedures, situations, and policies that influence how conflicts are progressing towards resolution. The de-escalation process tends to take three forms: when a party imposes its will on another towards, one or both parties engage in a series of conciliatory gestures, and an external actor encourages all sides to enter into a mode of de-escalation (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 177-214).

The choice of de-escalating policies should depend on the objectives pursued and the current circumstances if they are to be successful. In the first place, preventing disruptive escalation is simpler and certainly less costly for the antagonists than attempting to de-escalate when the fight has been raging for a long time. But until a conflict has visibly escalated, it can also be expensive to take action. De-escalating measures can seem unnecessary for potential intermediaries, or at least difficult to organize support for. Besides that, preventive measures could fail and it is likely that such undertakings are responsible for further deterioration. The risks and cost of premature de-escalation are much greater for members of one of the adversaries. They are likely to look vulnerable and are accused of losing what they might have won if only the war had continued and even escalated. A greater understanding of how to constructively intensify and de-escalate a conflict will lead to decreasing certain risks and costs (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 177-214).

Even though force and coercion are often important, the evidence is that it is not always the product of immutable, large-scale powers or the acts of a few brave and wise individuals to de-escalate intractable conflicts. In order for a seemingly intractable conflict to move beyond a transition supporting de-escalation to become radically changed, many conditions need to converge, so these must be paired with new meanings. Resistance and reversals are possible, and it is important to resolve them, too (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012, pp. 177-214).

Zartman (2001) raises a concept of a ripe moment of a conflict, which is based on the perception of mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). The theory is based on the idea that if the parties are stuck in a dispute from which they will not escalate to victory, and they both pursue an alternative policy or

way out, this deadlock is frustrating for them both (although not generally in equal measure or for the same reasons). The mutually hurting stalemate is based on cost-benefit analysis, entirely compatible with the notions of rationality of public choice (Sen, 1970; Arrow, 1963; Olson, 1965) and public choice studies of war termination and negotiation (Brams 1990, 1994; Wright 1965), which assumes that a group will choose the option it prefers, and that a decision to adjust is triggered by increased pain associated with the current (conflictual) path.

Ripeness is inherently a perceptual event, and there are likely to be objective referents to be experienced, as in any subjective experience. If the parties do not accept a clear evidence (in the opinion of someone else) that they are in an impasse, there has not (yet) been a mutually hurting stalemate, and if they consider themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the evidence, the MHS is present (Zartman, 2001).

The other aspect required for a fluid moment is less complex and also perceptible: a way out. There is no need for the parties to be able to find a particular solution, only a sense that a negotiated search solution is feasible and that the other party shares that sense and desire to search as well (Zartman, 2001).

Ripeness is just an aspect, required but not sufficient, to begin negotiations. It is not self-fulfilled or self-implemented. It must be seized, either directly by the parties or, if not, by a mediator's persuasion. It is therefore not identical with its observations, which do not form part of its description, and is therefore not tautological. Not all ripe moments are so grasped and converted into negotiations, hence the importance of defining the significance and proof of ripeness to indicate when negotiations can be effectively initiated by opposing or third parties (Zartman, 2001).

The existence of a legitimate spokesperson on each side is a third factor in the concept of ripeness. It is of a different order as a structural element than the other two defining perceptual elements. The existence of strong leadership acknowledged as representative of each party and who can deliver

compliance with the agreement by that party is an essential (while alone insufficient) condition for the effective start or indeed end of productive negotiations (Zartman, 2001).

In his mission to mediate peace in El Salvador, Alvaro de Soto, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs at the United Nations, also supported the need for maturity. He points to the significance of the FMLN 's november 1989 offensive, after chronicling a series of failed interventions, the largest of the war, which penetrated the major cities, including the capital, but failed to dislodge the regime. The silver lining was that it was, almost practically, a decisive moment, the point at which negotiation could be seriously envisaged. The offensive showed the FMLN that a widespread rebellion could not be ignited. The offensive also revealed that right-wing elements in the government, and elites in general, could not be defended by the armed forces, let alone crush the insurgents. The features of a military deadlock, however inchoate at first, started to emerge. The notion that the war could not be resolved by military means, and that its continuation caused suffering that could no longer be borne, started to take shape as the dust settled. The offensive codified the nature of MHS. For a peaceful settlement, the dispute was ripe (deSoto, 1999, pp.7-8).

Unripeness should not be a justification for inaction by second or third parties, even though one or both of the parties to the dispute are mired in their hopes of escalation and victory (Zartman, 2001). The ripeness absence does not mean passivity due to the conflict. Instead, it helps finding challenges and ways to deal with them and manage the issue before resolution becomes feasible (Crocker, 1992, p.471).

Some strategies to start settling a conflict are: identify the parties needed to settle, identify the issues to be resolved and isolate the issues that are not resolvable in the dispute, identify air alternatives to the current dispute path, create contacts and bridges between the parties, clarify the costs and risks involved in pursuing resolution, establish requirements; and ensure support for a resolution strategy within the domestic context of each party (Stein and Pauly, 1992).

#### 4.3 MEDIATION PROCESS

Throughout history the individuals, groups and societies, have found their methods to enclose their destructive behaviour and ensure the order and peace in their environment. A good range of institutions, devices and mechanisms were invented to solve disputes between parties. Mediation is mentioned in the Bible (2000 BC), in ancient China, Greece, also in Renaissance diplomacy, and still one of the most significant devices of conflict resolution (Rubin, J. Z., Bercovitch, J., 1992, pp.1-30).

Barnes (2007, p. 8) supports that the revolution of dispute resolution in North America during the 1980's, where the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has been created as an alternative reliance on lawyers, litigation and adversarial dispute resolution. Increasingly, it is also an alternative to the negative aspects of the adversarial, common-law tradition American legal institutions during the last century. The author makes a substantial comment regarding the new patterns of conflicts, the large scale conflicts that will no longer be present or constant, similar to the two world wars, however, the localized ethnic, religious and cultural conflict will increase in volume.

Mediation practitioners were willing to sustain it as a mysterious practice, behind closed doors and scholars of mediation did not think it was susceptible to a systematic analysis, nor the pattern of behaviour could be detected nor any generalizations could be valid at the mediation spectrum (Rubin, J. Z., Bercovitch, J., 1992, pp.1-30).

Denying all these previous beliefs, more authors started to work on developing mediation discipline. Carl Stevens (1963) discusses that mediation is an integral part of a bargaining process, and an analysis of it is impossible except in the context of the general analysis of bargaining negotiations. With similar understanding as Stevens, Tom Schelling (1960) supports that 'mediation is probably best viewed as a communication arrangement or as a third party with a payoff structure of his own'. While Eckhoff (1966) supports mediation as an act of influencing the parties by appealing to their own interests.

Mediator's power of what he or she is allowed to manage the dispute may depend on who they are and what resources and competencies they have. International disputes are not static or uniform events, they might vary on different aspects such as parties, intensity, escalation, response, meaning and transformation (Rubin, J. Z., Bercovitch, J., 1992, pp.1-30).

Rubin and Bercovitch (1992, pp.1-30) structured some characteristics of a general analysis of what full diversity may be based upon:

- (1) Mediation is an extension and continuation of the parties' own conflict management efforts.
- (2) Mediation involves the intervention of an individual, group or organization into a dispute between two or more actors.
- (3) Mediation is a non-coercive, non-violent and ultimately nonbinding form of intervention.
- (4) Mediation turns an original bilateral dispute into triadic interaction of some kind. By increasing the number of actors from two to three, mediation effects considerable structural changes and creates new focal points for an agreement.
- (5) A mediator enters a dispute in order to affect, change, resolve, modify or influence it in some way.
- (6) Mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas,knowledge, resources and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators are often important actors with their own assumptions and agendas about the dispute in question. International mediators are both interested and concerned parties.
- (7) Mediation is a voluntary form of intervention. This means the parties retain their control over the outcome (if not always the process) of their dispute, as well as their freedom to accept or reject mediation or mediator's proposals.
- (8) Mediation operates on an ad hoc basis only. (Rubin and Bercovitch, 1992, pp.1-30)

#### And because of that they understand mediation as:

a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law. (Rubin and Bercovitch, 1992, pp.1-30)

The mediation system contains the parties, the mediator, the process of mediation and the context of mediation. These elements interacting can result differently according to each actor involved. On mediation the actors are determinant and highly influenced on the outcomes. It is routinely used in

international scenarios when the dispute is long, drawn out and complex. The parties' own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse, neither party is prepared to countenance further costs or loss of life, and both parties are prepared to cooperate to break their stalemate (Rubin, J. Z., Bercovitch, J., 1992, pp.1-30).

This dissertation approaches only the formal mediation, in which a political incumbent, a government representative or a high-level decision maker, acts in a capacity to mediate disputes between the official representatives of other groups or states. A formal mediation may have less influence from the individual once it is conducted by the role. In addition, it loses the flexibility however, it is immediate for the access of the high-level and influential decision makers. This approach weights the most the form, established procedures and roles, taking out the focal point from the mediator and its personality and have the power of influencing the political outcomes more directly (Rubin, J. Z., Bercovitch, J., 1992, pp.1-30).

The approach to contingency makes it clear that the option of a specific method of mediation is hardly random. Mediation selection is rarely random. It is influenced, among other things, by the features of the conflict, the nature of the social atmosphere and the identity of the mediator (Assefa, 1987). Mediation is a logical, diplomatic mechanism, reflecting a strategic dialogue between the parties and the mediator, which may, under certain circumstances, bring an end to violence and hostilities, or even promote a peace agreement and conflict transformation (Woods, 2018)

To be successful, international mediation must both represent and affect the larger framework of conflicts. This is one reason why various mediators use various techniques and emphasize various aspects of mediation. It is as simplistic as it is incorrect to interpret mediation results only as applied to mediation processes. In the general sense in which a mediator works, processes and procedures, techniques and methods are deduced. In terms of a simplistic cause and effect model in which a specific approach inevitably achieves a desired result, mediation must not be evaluated or understood. Mediation in general, and international mediation in particular, is not necessarily an

exogenous input which can be applied to all conflicts uniformly and indiscriminately. Nor is it just a set of guidelines, the strict application of which can affect or affect the parties. A mediator 's relationship with the parties to the conflict is mutual. In mediation, exchange and power are therefore bidirectional, not unidirectional (Rubin, J. Z., Bercovitch, J., 1992, pp.1-30).

The UN Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012) declares that an effective mediation process acknowledges the peculiarity of each conflict. The causes and complexities of the conflict, the roles, interests and coherence of the parties, the needs of the larger community and the regional and international environment are taken into account (UN, 2012).

This guidance requires eight aspects as fundamentals for an effective mediation, they are: preparedness, consent, impartiality, inclusivity, national ownership, international law and normative frameworks, coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort, and the last, quality peace agreements (UN, 2012).

For the purpose of this dissertation focal point the aspect of preparedness and inclusivity will be deepened. Preparedness blends the mediator 's individual expertise and skills with a cohesive team of experts, as well as the required political, financial and administrative support from the mediating body. Although the result is not predetermined, preparedness includes the strategy development at various points (such as pre-negotiations, negotiations and implementation) on the basis of thorough dispute analysis and stakeholder mapping, including the review of previous mediation efforts. Since a mediation process is never linear and not all elements can be completely managed, to adapt to the changing context, strategies need to be versatile. Preparedness enables the mediator to direct and track the mediation process, to help improve the bargaining capacity of the opposing parties and other stakeholders (where necessary), to assist them in achieving agreements, and to galvanize implementation support (including among international actors) (UN, 2012).

One common issue faced by mediators arises when one or both parties demand that certain conditions be met before talks can begin. In order to block talks, certain pre-conditions are also set

by hard-line leaders or in response to hard-line constituents. One is willing to compromise by setting a pre-condition that one knows the other party is unable to consider, thus transferring responsibility for the blockage to the other side (Peck, 2009).

In internal conflicts, a proposal by the government for the guerrillas to surrender or sign a ceasefire agreement before talks is the most common precondition. However, rebel groups often assume that only military pressure can compel government concessions, so they are typically reluctant to comply. Such a demand is a non-starter in most situations. War-time negotiations, primarily because of the external pressure that can be brought to bear, can potentially be simpler than peace-time negotiations (DeSoto, 2001)<sup>8</sup>.

It can also be made clear to the parties by third parties that substantive pre-conditions are not tolerable. Dinka (2001)<sup>9</sup> clarified to guerrilla groups in the negotiations in Burundi the difference between substantive preconditions that had to be the subject of negotiation and confidence-building preconditions that could be agreed to in order to build trust. Dinka (2001), on the other hand, makes it clear that what needs to be resolved are substantive issues, and no party can be asked to make a concession on those issues until negotiations begin.

Preparedness combines the individual knowledge and skills of a mediator with a cohesive team of specialists. Preparedness allows the mediator to guide and monitor the mediation process. A well-prepared and supported mediator is able to manage expectations and maintain a sense of urgency (UN, 2012).

Inclusivity refers to the degree and manner in which opposing parties and other stakeholders' viewpoints and interests are expressed and incorporated into the process and outcome of a mediation attempt. It is more likely that an inclusive process can recognize and resolve the root causes of conflict and ensure that the interests of the sectors of the community impacted are met. Inclusivity

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> de Soto, Alvaro (2001) Interview by Connie Peck as part of the UNITAR Programme for Briefing and Debriefing Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General, Geneva, Switzerland.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Dinka, Berhanu (2001) Interview by Connie Peck as part of the UNITAR Programme for Briefing and Debriefing Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General, Geneva, Switzerland.

further strengthens the credibility and national ownership of, and enforcement of, the peace agreement. Furthermore, it decreases the risk of excluded actors disrupting the mechanism. An inclusive process does not mean that all stakeholders are actively involved in the formal discussions, but rather promotes the dialogue between the parties to the conflict and other stakeholders and provides frameworks for the participation of all process viewpoints. Conflicting groups can not be presumed to have credibility with the general public, or to represent them (UN, 2012).

Multiple entry points and different channels for participation are generated through inclusive process design. Systematic outreach is required to incorporate the viewpoints of opposing parties and other stakeholders, particularly women, and to build new peace constituencies. However, the urgency of achieving an initial ceasefire agreement could, in some situations, lead to more restricted intervention in the early stages of a process. It is a difficult challenge for mediators to reconcile the humanitarian imperative to stop the killings with the demands of opposing parties and normative commitments (UN, 2017).

Peace talks are rooted in a larger peace process with separate negotiation phases that can last years. Different types of documents may consist of agreements: pre-negotiation agreements, framework / substantive agreements, and implementation / renegotiation agreements. Issues are negotiated in several different agreements in several peace processes and are either brought together or ratified by a substantive final agreement. Implementation agreements also follow peace agreements and require new talks and renegotiations, partially because the mechanism 'checks whether compromises reached at an earlier stage can be reversed' (Bell, 2006).

The potential conflict between inclusivity and performance must be dealt with by mediators. As the consultation base grows and/or several forums are used to involve actors at various levels, mediation mechanisms become more complicated (and may be overloaded). Furthermore, the participation of interest groups that are not easily identified or lack strong leadership, such as social movements and

youth groups, can be difficult. These types of problems place an emphasis on the mapping, preparation and management of the process by stakeholders (UN, 2012).

Who to include in the process is another topic that can be controversial. Most mediators advise that all major parties involved in the situation should be included and warn that any left outside the talks will have a greater opportunity to behave as spoilers (Bercovitch, Krenebyuk, Zartman, 2009, pp.413-434). A recipe for failure is to keep a warring party out of a negotiation. It is important to have the key actors at the table in a dispute, without which you would not expect them to comply with whatever agreements occur (DeSoto, 2001).

However, Ould-Abdallah (2001) warns against the inclusion of radicals, as they can threaten an already shaky political atmosphere. By comparison, Vendrell (2002) argues that it typically depends on the strength of the party to have an extremist group. The question, the author maintains, is not whether you have militant groups at the table, but whether you comply with their demands that are contrary to the aims and values of the Charter of the United Nations.

A larger community of constructive, prominent people, such as religious leaders, elders or academics, is one way to resolve the issue of extremists (Bercovitch, Krenebyuk, Zartman, 2009, pp.413-434). Sahnoun (2003)<sup>10</sup> proposes that visibility should be given to these individuals, particularly when successful negotiations meet.

From a gender perspective, it is primarily male leaders of the fighting parties negotiating an end to the war and negotiating an end to the war. Setting the conditions for peace. The argument often provided is that those who have taken up arms must be brought together by the peace table because it is up to them to stop the fighting. The task of restoring a nation that emerges from war involves the equal participation of men and women. Ensuring the involvement of women in such talks, by making the process more democratic and sensitive to the priorities of all segments of the affected community, strengthens the credibility of the process. In this sense, the peace table becomes a forum

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Sahnoun, Mohamed (2003) Interview by Connie Peck as part of the UNITAR Programme for Briefing and Debriefing Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General, Geneva, Switzerland.

for reforming institutions and systems and opening the door to greater social justice (Anderlini, 2000).

Nevertheless, mediators may encourage conflict parties to include senior women in their delegations and to hold frequent consultations with women's representatives, such as: encouraging conflict parties to include at least one third of senior women in their delegations, considering design choices such as granting additional seats at the table to be filled by females to dispute groups, and helping the parties to the dispute to hold frequent meetings with their constituents, including women's representatives (UN, 2017).

The UN mediation mechanism formed a Civil Society Assembly in 1994, with members from a variety of civil society organizations, to address this problem in Guatemala. While the Assembly was not directly involved in the negotiations between the government and the guerrillas, it was able to express its views and, more significantly, it was entitled to review and decide on all the agreements reached during the bilateral talks. The decision was not binding, but it placed pressure on the key parties to take a wider spectrum of interests into account (Arnault, 2001)<sup>11</sup>. The desire to improve or impact the hope of achieving goals are the very reasons why so many international goals have been achieved. Actors are anxious to mediate. Individual mediators, having only reference, authority and knowledge services, display a clear propensity to use facilitative communication techniques. Institutions and associations are provided with legitimacy and knowledge tools, and most of their mediation techniques are communicative and formal in nature. Finally, states may use communicative, bureaucratic, and coercive methods with so many tools at their disposal (Rubin, J. Z., Bercovitch, J., 1992, pp.1-30).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Arnault, Jean (2001) Interview by Connie Peck as part of the UNITAR Programme for Briefing and Debriefing Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General, Geneva, Switzerland.

Those mechanisms will also help to promote more effective participation by ensuring fair access to funding, space, facilitation and protection for women delegates of conflict parties, as well as for women participating in the Track II<sup>12</sup> processes (UN, 2017).

At this point of the dissertation, it is possible to understand that the first hypothesis was answered, the UN should have different entry points to include women in mediation of peace agreements indeed. During a mediation process the mediator should be aware of the conflict, its consequences and escalation looking forward to de-escalate it. During the process of mediation it is important to understand that the conflict is still happening while the parts are trying to solve it somehow.

Due to the organizational developments in conflicts sustained by Kriesberg and Dayton (2012, pp. 143-176) the leaders involved in the mediation process might be reluctant in implementing a different variety of representativeness on it, once any mistake might cause a huge discomfort and the price escalates. Furthermore, a conflict may occur due to one pertinent issue, but additionals and more general ones might arise after the struggle begins. Jacoby (2008, pp. 144-159), explained that as the military power increases due to alliances or military build up, such alliances have a trade-off involving loss of autonomy and ability to respond.

These aspects lead to the conclusion that the involved mediation, especially the mediator who should manage the situation, might face an environment of hostility when it comes to including a different panel of representatives due to the possibility of a mistake and its price. What makes it important to address the different issues and peoples who are involved on the conflict (allies, people who live in the conflict area and affected by it), recognizing that the conflict situation is changing during the period in question, as well as the mediation process, explaining its non-linearity (UN, 2012), the ripe moment (Zartman, 2001) must be discussed by the mediator bringing up the aspects as MHS, make the parties understand a way out, and look for a legitimate spokesperson. The first hypothesis has been confirmed positive and supported by all the arguments in the paragraphs above,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Track II process is an unofficial, informal dialogue between representatives of adversary groups or nations aimed at developing tactics, manipulating public opinion, coordinating human and material resources in ways that could help settle their conflict.

because of that it is important to have different points of entry for women ensuring that they will be able to integrate the right issue at the right time with a legit spokesperson.

## 4.3.1 INCLUSIVITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

body or committee of some kind (Nilsson, 2012).

It has been established that there is a deficit of theories about a concept of civil society in peacebuilding (Paffenholz, 2010, p.43), even though the concept of civil societies can be defined in different ways, it is generally seen as independent from the state with its governing bodies, and independent from the political sphere containing political parties. In addition it is often seen as a collection of non-state-created voluntary organizations and groups (Spurk, 2010, p.7; Belloni, 2008, p.182). In line with this, civil society is known to be independent from state and political parties and is made up of a wide variety of voluntary social organisations, such as religious associations, women's organizations, human rights groups, and labor unions. It is also understood that civil society may not be so "civil" in fact (Krznaric, 1999; Orjuela, 2003).

It has been found that the participation of members of civil society strengthens the validity of the agreements concluded and thereby increases the likelihood of a permanent end to war (Belloni, 2008; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; Wanis-St John and Kew, 2008). Participation in civil society improves public participation and brings to the table local, context-sensitive information that facilitates the implementation of local-level agreement provisions (Prendergast and Plumb, 2002). Civil society participants are deemed to be involved in a peace agreement when they are granted a role in the drafting of the agreement, depending on the text of the peace agreement, or when the agreement allows them to engage in the subsequent peace process. Civil society actors, for example, may have a seat at the negotiating table and be one of the signatories to the agreement, or the peace agreement may stipulate that, during the implementation process, they are to be put in a monitoring

Thus, there is a potential dilemma between growing and maintaining the integrity of the peace process effectiveness (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008). As far as effectiveness is concerned, many scholars

have stressed that the participation of civil society participants could increase the difficulty of peace talks, which could, at worst, preclude agreement from being reached. Additional veto players may be included in getting unarmed groups into the peace talks, which may make it more difficult to achieve an agreement. In addition, even if such actors are not given the right to veto a deal, they would at least benefit from the peace agreement by participating, thus reducing the compromises that could be granted to militant groups in order to make them stop fighting. The participation of civil society actors will, therefore, reduce the number of possible compromises and make it more difficult to persuade warring actors to stop fighting and to introduce a peace settlement (Cunningham, 2007).

More precisely, it has been proposed that civil society actors will have at least three separate roles to play in order to contribute to establishing credibility and control of the peace process. Next, often civil society groups are consulted to become familiar with their viewpoint on topics that are debated between the warring parties. Second, in order to influence the negotiation process by representative decision-making, civil society organisations that have a certain degree of political support should also be granted a seat at the negotiating table. Finally, it is possible for actors at the grassroots level to engage directly in inter-community meetings and other public forums. The premise that all these forms of involvement are normal is the notion that more stable results are likely to be obtained through a peace process that is not only top-down, but also contains elements of peace building from below (Nilsson, 2012).

Nilsson (2012) in her article was able to test three different hypotheses relating to civil societies, peace agreement and political parties, including other variables. In her work she analyzed 83 peace agreements reached in 40 different conflicts (post Cold-War). After testing the hypotheses her conclusions were when civil society participants are involved in the peace agreement, the probability of peace failure among the signatories is decreased by 64 percent, while the overall peace figure is 50 percent. More precisely, if all civil society organizations and political parties are

involved in the peace deal, the probability of peace collapse is reduced by 62 percent for the signatory warring parties. Similar to the findings concerning the signatories, if there is a mixture of civil society actors and political parties in the peace agreement, the likelihood of the overall collapse of peace is decreased by 60 percent. Therefore, only when it comes to the complete longevity of peace that the participation of civil society participants in a peace agreement decreases by about 43 percent the probability that overall peace in non-democracies will collapse (Nilsson, 2012).

## 4.3.2 WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION AS CIVIL SOCIETY

As said in previous chapters the attempting of women's inclusion should be on different and several times, the peace negotiations might be used as a window to cover the gap that already existed and help increase the women's political participation in a post conflict country (Anderson, 2006). For instance, in comparison to non-post-conflict countries on the continent, post-conflict African countries enjoy considerably higher rates of female legislative representation and a faster trajectory of implementing women's rights reforms because women's groups have grasped the opportunity for political change (Tripp, 2015). In countries with higher levels of gender equality that allow for women's political participation, permanent peace is usually more possible (Gizelis, 2009).

Women and women's groups who signed peace agreements can be assumed having a direct impact on the negotiations with voice and influence. Also, they are a broad variety of political actors as female members of armed groups, female government representatives, and female delegates from civil society groups (Krause, Krause and Bränfors, 2018). Connections between groups of women in civil society and female signatories have a positive effect on the quality and implementation of the agreement. Both the consistency of the substance of the agreement and the compliance rate of the provisions contribute to a more durable peace (Joshi and Quinn, 2015, 2017). Women signatories may become negotiators who connect civil society women's local-level networks to one-stop negotiations. Brokers are people who bridge gaps in social systems and encourage the flow across the gap of products, information, or expertise (Burt, 2005; Stovel and Shaw, 2012: 140). While they

often rely on informal and personal relationships, since network reconfigurations change social integration structures, their behaviors can have major macro-level implications (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 140).

It is crucial that women's delegates and women's civil society groups work together because civil society is gendered and the general presence of civil society groups does not automatically mean that women's groups are given access to influence the negotiations. In Guatemala (1991-1995), for example, Luz Mendez, the only female member of the rebel delegation of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca and a signatory of several peace process agreements, worked with groups of women from civil society who did not have direct access to the negotiations (Krause, Krause and Bränfors, 2018).

During the post-conflict era, peace mechanisms with wide public support, agreements with a high number of provisions reflecting a socio-political reform agenda, and high compliance rates for agreement provisions are most likely to contribute to permanent peace (Krause, Krause and Bränfors, 2018).

## 5. DATA ANALYSES

In this chapter, I will present the data analyses from the database provided on PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset, and PA-X Gender (Bel et al. 2020). From the first database was extracted the agreements which had UN signatories (ImUN), the entities with any provisions of civil societies (CivSo) and the ones that mentioned any category of women's provision (GeWom).

ImUN: UN Signatory Binary variable, takes the value of 1 if the peace agreement includes any signature, in whatever capacity, of any UN official, or official of UN organizations (or in the case of unsigned declarations the UN is clearly one of the declaring parties). If no such signatures appear in the agreement, the value on this variable is 0.

CivSo: Binary variable, takes the value of 1 if the peace agreement includes any provisions specifically addressed at the inclusion of civil society, for example, through Peace Building Commissions, or through general calls for inclusion. This includes references to 'civic space' (or similar), and includes references to the participation of third sector/NGOs, transnational civil society

organisations (e.g. UNICEF), consultation, and provisions that state that the peace agreement shall be distributed/spread in society. If no such provisions appear in the agreement, the value on this variable is 0. Note: Flows of humanitarian assistance (e.g. granting safe passage for delivery of humanitarian aid) mentioning involvement of international or transnational non-governmental organisations are coded under both civil society and (where appropriate) mobility. Provision of humanitarian assistance is coded under development/socio-economic reconstruction.

GeWom: Women, girls and gender this is a binary variable, taking the value of 1 if any of the peace agreement provisions are specifically addressing women, their inclusion, and their rights. This includes references to girls, widows, mothers, sexual violence (or forms thereof), gender violence, UNSC 1325 or CEDAW, lactating women. If no such provisions are present in the agreement, the value of the variable is 0. (Bell et al. 2020a)

These agreements were identified in the second database (PA-X Gender) by the agreement id (AgtId: Agreement ID Unique identifying number for each of the agreements) and separated on a different spreadsheet. From these agreements, was quoted the variable time (before and after 31/10/2000) and the CivSo (present or not).

The aspects analyzed were the gender effective participation (WggEffPart), women's role and consideration in implementation of the agreement (WggImplRole), and signing or witnessing agreement (WggImplSign).

Effective participation [WggEffPart] This category concerns more general language of effective participation for women in governance. These are not precise quotas but rather the inclusion of non-numeric commitments to have women's representation, requirements to address gender participation or equality in political institutions, commitments to adequate representation, effective/equal participation etc. When such provisions are present, the value on the variable is equal to 1, otherwise takes the value of 0.

Women's role and consideration in implementation of the agreement [WggImplRole] Accounting for any references to women being given a specific role in implementing the agreement or gender sensitive implementation mechanisms, this variable takes the value of 1 when such references are present, and 0 otherwise.

Signing or Witnessing agreement [WggImplSign] The situation of signing or witnessing of agreement 'as women' – but NOT including any signature by a woman or women - rather just women signing as part of a specific women's group, or women's delegation is accounted for in this variable. The value is 1 if such signing or witnessing occurred, and 0 otherwise. (Bell et al. 2020b)

It was generated, independently, as a specific aspect of women's general participation (GePar) which identifies the agreements with any positive results over WggEffPart, WggImplRole and WggImplSign. Through this aspect it is possible to find the agreements that at some point had women's participation.

From this database it will be possible to analyse the situation of women on peace agreements signed by the UN. The analyses will be on the period previous and after the UNSCR 1325/00. The cut made on agreements signed by the UN, previously the UNSCR 1325/00 the total of agreements found were 235. The following chart (Chart 1) demonstrates the universal agreements signed by the UN which had no provisions over civil societies. At this point the database extracted the total of 112 (47,66%) agreements, what 5 (2,13%) of them had some provision of women and only one (0,43%) had a general participation of women (GePar).




Chart 1: over the agreements with the UN as signatories and with no provision over civil society, before the UNSCR 1325/2000. It shows the agreements which had a provision of any kind about women and female participation, as participation, important role signatories and the GePar aspect.

On the following chart (Chart 2) the universe is a UN signed agreement with some kind of provision about civil societies. The total agreement in this scenario is 123 (52,34%), which 27 (11,49%) makes some kind of provisions about women, and only 3 (1,28%) had a general participation of women (GePar).




Chart 2: over the agreements with the UN as signatories and with some provision over civil society, before the UNSCR 1325/2000. It shows the agreements which had a provision of any kind about women and female participation, as participation, important role signatories and the GePar aspect. Comparing these cuts (Chart 1 and 2) on the agreements it is possible to conclude that there was an increase of 9,36% on the agreements with any provision of women (GeWom) which the expected proportion would be 0,51%, overcoming in 8,85%, when there is some civil society provision. There was an increase also on the aspect GePart from the agreements without to the ones with the civil society provision of 0,85%, which the proportionally expected would be 0,47%, overcoming in 0,38% of the expected.

On the following charts were quoted the agreements signed by the UN after the UNSCR1325/00 summing 190 units.

On the following chart (Chart 3) the agreements without any civil society provisions were 61 units (32,11%), which 18 (9,47%) had some kind of women's provision, and only one (0,53%) had a general participation of women (GePar).




Chart 3: over the agreements with the UN as signatories and with no provision over civil society, after the UNSCR 1325/2000. It shows the agreements which had a provision of any kind about women and female participation, as participation, important role signatories and the GePar aspect.

On the next chart (Chart 4) the scenario is post UNSCR 1325/00 with some kind of provision of civil societies 129 (67,89%) agreements, which 68 (35,79%) had some women's provision and 34 (17,89%) had general participation. 27 as WggEffPart, 14 as WggImplRole and 4 as WggImplSign.




Chart 4: over the agreements with the UN as signatories and with some provision over civil society, after the UNSCR 1325/2000. It shows the agreements which had a provision of any kind about women and female participation, as participation, important role signatories and the GePar aspect. From these two last charts (chart 3 and 4)it is possible to conclude that there is an increase on GeWom of 26,32%, also of 17,37% on the aspect of general participation (GePar) in peace agreement with civil societies provision when compared to the one with no provision. Proportionally these numbers would be 20,02% (GeWom) and 0,011% (GePar). It is shown for the first time, agreements on WggImpRole (14) and WggImplSign (4).

Analysing all the charts is possible to see the increase on GeWom of 31,65% and on GePar of 16,72% after the UNSCR 1325/00, however, clearly there is a difference on how much agreements counted with women's participation leading to a conclusion that the UNSCR 1325/00 had shown an effect on UN conflict management environment increasing the number of them with provision addressing to women (GeWom), but not on the same percentage as including women (GePar). As

the table 1 shows below. This increase shows that the efforts made by the UN had presented some effect. Nonetheless it had not the same effect over the two aspects.

	Total GeWom	Total GePar
Pre UNSCR 1325/2000	13,62%	1,70%
Post UNSCR 1325/2000	45,26%	18,42%
Increase after UNSCR 1325/2000	31,64%	16,72%

Table 1: percentage of the peace agreements signed by the UN before and after the UNSCR 1325/2000 broken into the aspects of GeWom and GePar, followed by the increase of these aspect after the UNSCR 1325/2000.

Another perspective that must be analysed is the increase of agreements post UNSCR 1325/2000 with civil societies provisions were 24,30% (GeWom) and 16,62% (GePar). While the agreements that had no provisions over civil societies were 7,35% (GeWom) and 0,10% (GePar).

# 6. DISCUSSION

These charts demonstrate that women and women's groups who signed peace agreements can be assumed to have a direct impact on the negotiations with voice and influence. In addition, women signatories may become negotiators who connect civil society women's local-level networks to one-stop negotiations. Connections between groups of women in civil society and female signatories have a positive effect on the quality and implementation of the agreement. Women signatories may become negotiators who connect civil society women's local-level networks to one-stop negotiations (Krause, Krause and Bränfors, 2018).


The agreements that had female signatures were four. The agreement of the joint Bougainville ex-combatants agreement on weapons disposal (Rotakas Record) signed on 03/may/2001, the peace agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and

Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties (Accra Agreement) signed on 18/august/2003, the agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) signed on 18/august/2015, and the agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) and the South Sudan National Liberation Movement/Army (SSNLM/A) signed on 02/april/2016.

Women and women's groups who signed peace agreements can be assumed having a direct impact on the negotiations with voice and influence. Connections between groups of women in civil society and female signatories have a positive effect on the quality and implementation of the agreement. It is crucial that women's delegates and female civil society groups work together because civil society is gendered (Krause, Krause and Bränfors, 2018; Joshi and Quinn, 2015, 2017).

#### **6.1 BOUGAINVILLE**

The dispute over Bougainville, an island under the jurisdiction of Papua New Guinea (PNG), started in 1987 as a dispute over Bougainville Copper Ltd, an Australian subsidiary, for compensation for land use. The fundamental question of independence soon arose and the conflict between the PNG government and the native islanders intensified, led in turn by the Revolutionary Army of Bougainville (BRA). There were an estimated 20,000 deaths in the war before the fighting ended in 1998. A number of pre-negotiation agreements resulted in a lasting and irrevocable ceasefire agreement and a mechanism for the normalization of the PNG-Bourgainville relationship, including elections (Bell et al, 2020a, 2020b).



Timeline 1: It shows the timeline of Bougainville's conflict over the different stages of peace processes. The black point is the referring agreement to the joint Bougainville ex-combatants agreement on weapons disposal (Rotakas Record) signed on 03/may/2001.

The Timeline 1 shows the big picture of the Bougainville conflict, it is possible to see that the conflict is complex and passes through phases. Illustrating what Kriesberg and Dayton (2012, pp.1-48) says that conflicts are never static, but fluid and pass through phases as the parties accept new tactics, viewpoints, achieve or struggle to accomplish those goals, or the makeup of the groups or the setting in which they are shifting. Conflicts arise, escalate, de-escalate and settle.


The MHS (Zartman, 2001) is evidenced in this conflict especially in 1998 when it reached the total of 20000 deaths. Also it must be understood that the conflict came through a long period of dispute since 1987, leading to the acknowledgement of ripeness when the conflict moved to a peace agreement that is lasting until today.

The entrance of other protagonists may interfere in the flow of the conflict, especially when they are other states or multilateral organizations, depending on the international power balance, to a decrease in tensions or a more prolonged conflict (Jacoby, 2008, pp. 144-159), this point is marked by the UN entrance on 1997, followed by a signed peace agreement of ceasefire in 1998.

## **6.2 LIBERIA**

The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) targeted border posts in 1989 as part of a movement to remove the Samuel Doe dictatorship. This sparked a violent civil war that killed about 150,000 and displaced an estimated 850,000 individuals by 1995. The outbreak of war, like poverty, discrimination and repression, is linked to the country's domestic socio-economic and political climate of the 1980s. Its sustenance, however, is also linked to past oppression by 'American Liberians' against indigenous Liberians, and the resulting deep ethnic divisions (Bell et al, 2020a, 2020b).

Peace talks started in 1992 and concluded in 1997. However, peace only lasted for a brief time, and the war against the elected president, Charles Taylor, was revived in 1999. Together with the Armed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the Guinean-backed group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) occupied two-thirds of the country by 2003 and besieged the capital Monrovia, forcing Charles Taylor into exile in Nigeria. The parties to the dispute signed the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August of the same year, and new general elections were held in 2005 (Bell et al, 2020a, 2020b).



Timeline 2: It shows the timeline of Liberia's conflict over the different stages of peace processes.

The black point is the referring agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties (Accra Agreement) signed on 18/august/2003

The Liberia timeline (Timeline 2) highlights the complexity of the conflict, Kriesberg and Dayton (2012, pp. 1-48) explain the mobility of it, conflicts are always fluid and have different phases. The conflicts arise, escalation, de-escalation and settlement are hardly on this sequence, always depending on the strategies of the actors, as well as their answers to any retaliation.

The MHS (Zartman, 2001) is evidenced in this conflict especially in 2003 when the parties decided to sign a ceasefire agreement. It must also be recognized that since 1989, the dispute has gone through a long period of conflict, leading to the acknowledgment of ripeness as the conflict progressed to a peace agreement that continues to this day.

The entrance of other protagonists may interfere in the flow of the conflict, especially when they are other states or multilateral organizations, depending on the international power balance, to a decrease in tensions or a more prolonged conflict (Jacoby, 2008, pp. 144-159).

Furthermore, there was participation of civil society, strengthening the validity of the agreements (Belloni 2008; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St John and Kew 2008). The authors concluded that it might increase the likelihood of a permanent end to war. Civil society involvement increases civic participation and brings local, context-sensitive information to the table, which encourages the enforcement of provisions of the local agreement (Prendergast and Plumb 2002), dismissing that this peace agreement was made from a top-down process, but containing elements of peace building from below (Nilsson, 2012).

## **6.3 SOUTH SUDAN**

The agreements concern several different dyads, as well as South Sudan's negotiated independence, and subsequent internal conflict in South Sudan. Sudan-South Sudan. The long-standing rivalry between the country's north and south goes back to colonial times, when a so-called 'Southern Policy' was enforced by the British, seriously hampering population movements between these large areas. Southern groups began to fight for independence shortly after achieving independence in 1956; this struggle was officialized in 1983 with the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), soon backed internationally. The war escalated when the Islamic Front Government enforced strict sharia laws<sup>13</sup> in the south after it took over power in 1988. The military situation entered a stalemate a decade later, allowing for internationally mediated peace talks to commence in 1997. After more fighting, a final negotiation push began in 2002, leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 (Bell et al, 2020a, 2020b).

Post referendum, Sudan-South Sudan. In July 2011, South Sudan became independent; since then, relations between the two countries have been complicated and violent conflict has since escalated led by the SPLM (North) in the Sudanese Nuba Mountains region (Bell et al, 2020a, 2020b).


Other long-standing violent conflicts are in the country's east and west. The Beja Congress, founded in 1957 in the east, is the spearhead of a 'peaceful' opposition movement today. In the west, in the early 2000s, the violent conflict in Darfur escalated and quickly gained international attention, also

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Islamic laws derived from the religious precepts of Islam, particularly the Quran and the hadith.

resulting in accusations of genocide against leading Sudanese government figures. The situation on the ground is complicated, with over a dozen organizations battling the Sudanese government and associated groups like the Janjaweed (most prominently the Sudanese Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement), while both parties have changed sides on various occasions (Bell et al, 2020a, 2020b).

Internal South Sudan - Violent confrontation broke out between government forces of the SPLM / A and anti-government groups in December 2013, after President Salva Kiir accused opposition leader Riek Machar of attempting a coup. In addition, several other political militias have joined the conflict, as have communal militias. The Agreement to Settle the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed in 2015. The agreement was revitalized in 2018 due to poor execution. In September 2019, after struggling to form a united transitional government, Kiir and Machar decided to create a power-sharing government (Bell et al, 2020a, 2020b).



Timeline 3: It shows the timeline of South Sudan's conflict over the different stages of peace processes. The black point 'A' is the referring agreement the agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) signed on 18/august/2015, and black point 'B' is the agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) and the South Sudan National Liberation Movement/Army (SSNLM/A) signed on 02/april/2016.

The South Sudan timeline (Timeline 3) highlights the complexity of the conflict, Kriesberg and Dayton (2012, pp. 1-48) explain the mobility of it, conflicts are always fluid and have different phases. The conflicts arise, escalation, de-escalation and settlement are hardly on this sequence, always depending on the strategies of the actors, as well as their answers to any retaliation.

The influence of recent constitutional changes, coups, popular revolutions, and territorial secessions once those experiences may impact the character of the administration, what leads to effect on political elite's response to a crisis. Explaining why the duration of the regime weights on crisis escalation (Levis, 1988). The recent independence of the country clearly had shown their effects on the peace process, acknowledging that the conflict is more intense after their independence in 2011.

It is known that, the first peace agreement is the point A (18/august/2015) followed by the second one, point B (2/april/2016), the MHS (Zartman, 2001) is evidence in this conflict on those events but also on the period of their independence when the parties decided to sign a ceasefire agreement. The entrance of other protagonists may interfere in the flow of the conflict, especially when they are other states or multilateral organizations, depending on the international power balance, to a decrease in tensions or a more prolonged conflict (Jacoby, 2008, pp. 144-159).

The agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) and the South Sudan National Liberation Movement/Army (SSNLM/A) signed on 02/april/2016 (point B on the Timeline 3) had participation of civil society, strengthening the validity of the agreements (Belloni 2008; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St John and Kew 2008). The authors concluded that the possibility of a permanent end to war would increase. Civil society engagement enhances political participation and brings to the table local, context-sensitive information that facilitates the implementation of local agreement clauses (Prendergast and Plumb 2002), dismissing the top-down process of this peace agreement, but containing elements of peace building from below (Nilsson, 2012).

## 7. CONCLUSION

The research of this dissertation allowed us to comprove that the UNSCR 1325/2000 was the first and most important gender equality resolution. From this resolution on, the UN had made an effort of producing more resolutions similar to this looking forward to gender equality. UNSCR 1325/2000 as a pioneer resolution about it has a significant meaning and is more global about the subject.

The resolution has four pillars: participation, protection, prevention, and recovery and relief. Approaching mostly the participation pillar, this dissertation shows the importance of a peace process, and what is the scenario to be faced.

The conflict analysis is around the large scale conflicts and mostly international conflicts. It is understood by social conflicts as natural, social, inevitable and essential aspects of social life. They provide the pathway through the challenges and the oppressive status quo that they are now to implement desired social change. Constructive forms of social conflict management would preserve relationships, maximize mutually satisfactory outcomes, and minimize reliance on violence. Moral concerns are what make conflict analysts and the parties involved to try to understand each other. Simplistic analyses might be harmful and misleading, the authors argue. For long term effectiveness, parties and analysts should avoid self-indulgent perceptiveness and seek for an understanding of how the other party views the conflict.

Therefore, all social conflicts can be transformed, they are dynamic and tend to move through stages. Social movements, groups of interests and unofficial actors can advance peace initiatives. Conflicts emerge, escalate, de-escalate and settle.

Rationality arises on conflicts, the Prisoner's dilemma, shows the importance of the conflict escalation by rationality. Fear, anxiety, and anger mostly arises when people feel attacked and this feeling has a tendency of being expressed through harm to the presumed attacker. Shame and humiliation, and the desire of revenge is the fuel of many struggles. In conflicts the parties usually face zero sum situations where it is inevitable the win-lose scenario and they must fight for a positive perspective for themselves.

The duration of the regime weighs on crisis escalation because it may impact the character of the administration and how political elite's might respond to crises. The expansion of issues, a conflict may occur due to one issue, but additional and more general problems might arise after the struggle begins, practical issues such as a land division might become more complex when this land has also emotional or symbolic value.

The parties considered the impact on itself, how gratifying the conflict is for those involved. The impact on the adversary, when a party takes violent strategies it is intending to provoke the

adversary in order to escalate the conflict. The effects on the third parties are important when it comes to support and influence. In an international perspective the barbarity generally must reach a high level and persistency of destruction before any official intervention.

All those aspects must be analyzed and managed by a mediator in a peace process that choses mediation as a tool of dispute resolution. The mediator must be prepared and be aware of the importance of inclusivity. Mediation is never randomly chosen, as well their strategy, peace talks can take years to end the negotiation phase.

It is important to address the different issues and peoples who are involved on the conflict (allies, people who live in the conflict area and are affected by it), recognizing that the conflict situation is changing on a frequent basis, as well as the mediation process, explaining its non-linearity. The ripe moment (Zartman, 2001) must be discussed by the mediator bringing up the aspects as MHS, make the parties understand an exit strategy, and scan for a legitimate spokesperson.

Due to different stages of conflict, and also the mediation phases, the moment to insert women might be different according to the peculiarity of the conflict. Women might count through civil societies helping the decision makers of the peace process take a top-down decision with a perspective of bottom-up reality. Inclusivity is important to make the mediation table be similar to the conflict daily-basis. Inclusivity has shown a good impact over the peace quality and durability (Krause, Krause and Bränfors, 2018).

Analysing the PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset, and PA-X Gender (Bel et al. 2020), was possible to see the increase of 31,64% over GeWom and 16,72% over GePar after the implementation of the UNSCR 1325/2000. Demonstrating that the resolution is having a wider impact over the first aspect, rather than the second.

The peace process analysis that had female signatures communicated the aspect of inclusivity on the mediation, where several times counted with civil societies and women organizations. These

analyses could demonstrate the moment of MHS, ripeness, the impact of regime transition and the non-linearity of a peace process.

#### 8. REFLECTION

Before participating in this research, the author had some basic secondary research skills; but, as a result of undertaking the current analysis, those skills were substantially enhanced.

Specifically, the author acquired expertise in the following two secondary research directions: first, secondary data prioritization. A vast volume of data is now available in different secondary data outlets, like books, journals, magazines, newspapers, internet, etc. The author has been taught by current research experience that it is not physically possible, for obvious reasons, to examine all available data relating to the research issue.

Thus, during the literature review process of the report, the author learned to prioritize secondary data relating to research questions according to a collection of important parameters, such as the authority and qualifications of the author, the date of publication, the credentials of the publisher, etc.

The ability to prioritize secondary data in accordance with the above parameters obtained by the researcher provides a variety of important benefits, such as saving time and increasing the level of validity of secondary research results.

Second, the vital study of secondary data. Another significant contribution of research experience to the author's level of competence as a researcher relates to the creation of a critical attitude towards secondary data. It must be remembered that the author was likely to accept much of the opinions formulated in books as facts before engaging in this study, arguing that if a person has published a book, he or she must have a deep understanding of the subject discussed within the book. The latest research experience, however, has caused this point of view to be altered. In addition, the author of this paper was able to recognise a number of flaws relevant to some works mentioned in the literature review.

In terms of evaluating secondary data, the critical mentality gained by the author will prove to be highly useful in his future professional life, since the author will be equipped with the requisite skills to recognize the shortcomings associated with secondary data and provide feedback to enhance the material content.

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#### **APPENDIX 1**

- Goal 5. Achieve Gender Equality And Empower All Women and girls
- 5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere
- 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation
- 5.3 Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation
- 5.4 Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate
- 5.5 Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and public life
- 5.6 Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences
- 5.A Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws
- 5.B Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women
- 5.C Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels (UN, no date b)



#### TRENDS and PROJECTIONS for Gender Parity: UN SYSTEM

Representation of women as of 31 December 2005 and 31 December 2015, on contracts of a year or more, at all locations

		lepres	entatio	on of w	omen	Trend	s for 3	1 Dece	ember	2005-	31 De	cembe	er 2015						
	P	P-1		P-2		P-3		P-4		P-5		D-1		D-2		UG		Total	
-	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	
Representation of women (% of total staff)	57.8	60.9	55.4	57.5	43.2	45.5	34.3	41.8	28.7	36.1	25.4	33.5	23.3	30.5	21.5	27.3	37.2	42.8	
Change in Representation of women (% points)	3	.1	2	.1	2	.3	7	.5	7	.3	8	.1	7	.2	5	.8	5	.6	
Average annual increment (% points)	0	.3	0	.2	0	.2	0	.7	0	.7	0	.8	0	.7	0	.6	0	0.6	

Projections for reaching gene	der parity o	at current a	verage a	nnual incr	ement (31	Decembe	r 2005 – 31	Decemb	er 2015)
	P-1	P-2	P-3	P-4	P-5	D-1	D-2	UG	Total
Year at which gender parity will be reached	Attained	Attained	2035	2026	2034	2035	2042	2054	2028
Number of years to reach parity	Attained	Attained	23	12	20	20	28	38	12

Ave	rage annual	increment	required to	achieve 50	/50 gender	balance by	2021" (% p	ooints)
P-1	P-2	P-3	P-4	P-5	D-1	D-2	UG	Total
Attained	Attained	0.8	1.4	2.3	2.8	3.2	3.8	1.2

Source: CEB HR Report (2005), UN entities (2015). Prepared by the Focal Point for Women, UN System Coordination Division. (Note: Allow for 0.1 discrepancies due to rounding) Website: <a href="http://www.unwomen.ora/en/how-we-work/un-system-coordination/women-in-the-united-nations/current-status-of-women">http://www.unwomen.ora/en/how-we-work/un-system-coordination/women-in-the-united-nations/current-status-of-women</a>

(Women, U., no date)

If a year is not provided, projections for gender parity are as follows:
"Attained" = A representation of women of 50% or higher
"Never" = Grade has a negative average annual Increment or no growth
"N/A" = "Not Applicable", i.e. no staff, male or female, are present at grade

<sup>\*2021</sup> marks the end of Secretary-General Antonio Guterres' first term.



#### TRENDS and PROJECTIONS for Gender Parity: UN SECRETARIAT

Representation of women as of 31 December 2005 and 31 December 2015, on contracts of a year or more, at all location

	I	lepres	entatio	on of w	omen	Trend	s for 3	1 Dece	ember	2005-	31 De	cembe	er 2015						
	P	P-1		P-2		P-3		P-4		P-5		D-1		D-2		UG		Total	
	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015	
Representation of women (% of total staff)	65.6	58.8	50.9	55.6	41.2	44.0	34.3	39.6	29.2	33.5	26.1	31.4	27.9	27.6	17.6	23.3	37.4	41.1	
Change in Representation of women (% points)	-6	8.8	4	.7	2	.8	5	.3	4	.3	5	.3	-0	.2	5	.7	3	.7	
Average annual increment (% points)	-0	).7	0	.5	0	.3	0	.5	0	.4	0	.5	0	.0	0	.6	0	.4	

Projections for reaching gene	der parity o	at current a	verage a	nnual incr	ement (31	Decembe	r 2005 – 31	Decemb	er 2015)
	P-1	P-2	P-3	P-4	P-5	D-1	D-2	UG	Total
Year at which gender parity will be reached	Attained	Attained	2037	2035	2054	2050	Never	2062	2039
Number of years to reach parity (from 2015)	Attained	Attained	22	20	39	35	Never	47	24

Ave	rage annual	increment	required to	achieve 50	/50 gender	balance by	2021" (% p	oints)
P-1	P-2	P-3	P-4	P-5	D-1	D-2	UG	Total
Attained	Attained	1.0	1.7	2.8	3.1	3.7	4.5	1.5

\*2021 marks the end of Secretary-General Antonio Guterres' first term.

Source: CEB HR Report (2005), OHRM (2015). Prepared by the Focal Point for Women, UN System Coordination Division. (Note: Allow for 0.1 discrepancies due to rounding) Website: http://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/un-system-coordination/women-in-the-united-nations/current-status-of-women

(Women, U., no date)

Entry level:

P-1 very rarely position, One year of relevant professional work experience

P-2 minimum 2 years of work experience, No experience is required if applying to the young professionals programme

P-3 minimum 5 years of work experience

Mid-level professionals

P-4 minimum 7 years of work experience

P-5 minimum 10 years of work experience

Senior level professionals

P-6/D-1 minimum 15 years of work experience

P-7/D-2 more than 15 years of work experience

If a year is not provided, projections for gender parity are as follows:
"Attained" = A representation of women of 50% or higher
"Never" = Grade has a negative average annual Increment or no growth

<sup>&#</sup>x27;N/A" = "Not Applicable", i.e. no staff, male or female, are present at grade

Directors (D-1 and D-2 levels) represent the highest level of the career staffing structure of the Organization. As a Director you manage a programme of the Organization. You are also expected to provide leadership in formulating and implementing the substantive work programme of an office, determine priorities, and allocate resources for the completion of outputs and their timely delivery.

Senior professionals hired for positions at the P-6 and P-7 level typically work as senior advisers or experts, bringing several years of analytical and research experience to the United Nations. (UN CAREER, no date).